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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATIJRE OF TIIE CASE 
Respondents filed an action for a permanent injw1ction to enjoin the 
operation of a beauty parlor by Appellants, basing their claim upcm a 
restrictive covenant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
J\fter a bench trial, the District Court granted judgment in favor of 
Respondents permanently enjoining the operation of Appellants' beauty parlor 
on Appellants premises. 
RELIEF SOUQ-IT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a reversal of the trial court's judgment and a ruling that 
the restrictive covenant is void and unenforceable. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents do not dispute Appellants Statement of Facts as set forth in 
the first four paragraphs of Appellants Brief. Ho1vever, Appellants statement 
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as to what George Buzianis stt'stifinl to at trial is misleading. Although 11 
is correct that George Bnzianis test ifiL'c1 th~it he 01•erated a real estate busu" 
in his residence, what Appellants failed to mcnt ion is that George Buzianis 
further testified that his residP1h c· is located at NLDnber 36, Benchmark \'it1:i,, 
Subdivision, 300 feet away from Respondents property 1 ine (outside and not a 
part of the Upland Terrace Subdivision in question). Further, Ceorge Bu:iJiii· 
I 
did not testify that four or five businesses were in operation 1vithin the suh· I 
division close to Plaintiffs' residence. What he in fact testified to was that· 
he knows"of four or five businesses within a couple of blocks of our entry" an;, 
that "they are in the Upland Terrace" which consists of several subdivisions. j 
There is "A", "B", "C", and"D". He further testified that "I am aware of three 
beauty par~ors, one real estate office, are the ones that I am aware of" :md t: 
they are mostly in subdivisions "C" and "A". (Tr. ,pp. 113-117). What Appell~<i 
further failed to mention is that George Buzianis testified that to his knmile:: 
there are no commercial structures anywhere in Upland Terrace Subdivision, Plat i 
"C" and that any businesses were in homes. 
It is correct, as Appellants state in paragraph 6 of Appellants' StatemEr'. ! 
of Facts, that Plaintiff Rose Crimmins testified on cross-examination that she 
had her hau done by Defendant Barbara Simonds prior to the commencement of the 
instant ac':ion. However, what the Appellants failed to state is that on rediri.: 
examination, Plaintiff Rose Crimmins testified that this was done long before 
Defendant Barbara Simonds opened her beauty shop and perfonned a business out· 
her home. (Tr., pp. 144-151). 
Al though it is correct that the Defendant, Barbara Simonds that she inJ' ! 
actual knowledge of the restrictive covenant prior to being notified by ~!rs. 
Crimmins, as set forth in the final paragraph of :\ppcllants' Statement of Fie:· 
I 
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it is important to note that the trial court found that the Defend;rnts-Appellants, 
had constructive not ice of the restrictive covemnts at the time they purchased 
the property and that they would be batmd by them. (Tr., p. 188). 
ARL.Ufi'.NT 
POINT I 
1llf TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY Hllf.L:O 
IN REFUSING TO VOID Till'. COVl'N.l\Nf 
IN QUESTION AND IN RITUSJN(; TO 
VALIDATE Tf!E MODIFICATION 1\CRl'.EHENT 
Defendants-Appellants incorrectly cite the case of ~~~opolitan Investment 
~._ __ v. Sin~, 14 Utah 2nd 36, 376 P. 2d 940 (1962). The Plaintiff, and not the 
Defendant as in the present case, brought action to invalidate a restrictive 
covenant which stated that the property could not be used for the erection of 
a motel thereon. The District Court ruled for the Plaintiff and the Defendants 
appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Utah ruled that the findings of the lower court in-
validating the restrictive covenant were clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the District Court deciding 
that the restrictive covenant was valid. 
Defendants-Appellants cite the case of Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P.2d 781 (Utah 
1946). In that case the Supreme Court of Utah, upholding a restrictive covenant, 
came to the following conclusion: 
That if the general plan has been maintained 
from its inception, if i' has been understood, 
accepted, rebed on, and acted upon by all in 
interest, it is binding and enforceable on all. 
It goes with the land, an<l is equally binding 
on all purchasers with notice. 169 P. 2d At 784. 
It is undisputed that the area is residential in character. Plaintiffs 
Robert and Rose Crimmins bought a home relying on this very fact with the notice 
that the area was subject to a restrictive covenant. The trial court concluded 
-3-
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that the Defendants, as well as the Plaintiff:;, had constructive notice of 
those restrictive covenants at the t i111c the\' purch;1:;cd tlwi r propert1' aiid , 0 
they would be hound by them. (Tr., p. 188). 
Defendants-Appellants cite the case of lk'L'l1t __ \l_·~St<:-]_l,h<,'l1:i, ~Ll:J k11 1 SS<1, 
464 P. 2d 258 (1970), which sets forth the f:ictors to he conside1·ed in deter 
mining whether a neighborhood has changed suffiL·icntly to \\';1rrant voiding a 
restrictive covenant. In l!':'._t:_i_I!_, the lower court :;pccifically found tlwrc 
had been mnnerous violations of the restrict i\e covenants and concluded that 
the viol at ions had been so general and subs Lill t i a I as to ind i c1 t e ;1 purpo''' 
and intention of the residents of the area to ;diandon the general buildi11~ 
plan or sc!1eme. 
In Hecht_, the Supreme Court of ~:111sas in ,lc'ciding lihcthcr injunctil'c 
relief would be granted to restni in the violation of restrictive co\'enants, 
stated it is a matter with in the sound discretion of the trial court to be 
determined in the light of all the facts ancl circrnnstances. Absent manifest 
abuse of that discretion, the Appellate Court will not interfere. %4 P.:d )< 
In the present case, the trial court found that two or three busine>ses 
were in violation of the restrictive covenants. The other businesses, the 
trial court noted, were not businesses but the nonnal aspccts of running 
a home and neighborly life. The trial cow t concluded that the area had not 
changed in its character and is still residential, not business (Tr. pp. 18'1-i' 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL C:ClJRT CORRECTLY APPLIED THF 
IXXTRINE OF BALAJ\ONG OF Tl-IE EQUITIES 
The last case Defendants-~ppellants cite is l'_~a~1ikolas _Broth~~rs 
~nterpri~~5-!.· Sugarhouse ShoppingJ::,c;_nter ,~_ss<J_ciatt'_~, 535 P. 2d 1256 (IJtJh,l'i° 
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In P_apanikola~, the Utah Supreme Court L-011,;idcn·d the issue,; of covenant 
validity versus changed conditions and the a111higuitv of the covenant. The Court 
upheld the validity of the restrictive cove11;1nt Lleciding there 1<ere no changed 
conditions and that there was no amhi gu it y in the re,;t r ict i ve covenant. 
In th2 present case, the trial court fu1md th:1t the character of the 
property is still residential and that the covenant,; a1·e not :u11ihguous. rrr. 
pp. 189-190). 
In Papanikolas, the Utah Supreme Court applied the "balancing of injury 
test". The Court held that the Defendants wilfully and intentional]\· encroached 
upon the parking easement. The Court concluded that there is no basis to find 
an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ordering its removal". 
535 P. Zd ci+_ 1259. 
In t:1e present case, the trial court applied the doctrine of "balancing 
of injuries" stating "that it is regretful that the Defendants have expended 
the money that they have as far as building the beauty parlor and improving their 
premises for that operation". (Tr. p. 140). 
In the recent case of Leaver ~Grose, 610 P. 2d 1262, (Utah, Apri 1, 
1980), the facts are similiar to the instant case. Defendant brought action 
claiming t!1c restrictive covenants were unenforceable and seeking to invalidate 
them. The Supreme Court of Utah, in ~eaver, stated: 
Plainly and simply stated, Defendants untenable 
position was occassioned by her own action and 
there is no basis in eqiuty to shift the respon-
sibility therefore, to the plaintiffs. Defendant 
and plaint 1 ffs obviously had a Ji fference of 
opinion as to the enforceability of the restrictive 
covenants. At the outset (i.e. from the time she 
was able to obtain a building permit), Defendant 
convinced herself that the restrictive covenants 
were unenforceable Plaintiffs promptly objected 
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I 
to her remodeling project in July, and ag<!in 
in September, at which time Defendants attention 
was specifically drawn to the covenants in question. 
Then being faced with a controversy as to the en-
forceability of the restrictive covenants, Defendant 
agreed to cease construction until she could check the 
matter further. However, the validity of the legal 
position she had previously chosen, for she res~ned 
the remodeling project. In doing so, we can only 
conclude that she totally discounted the merits of 
plaintiffs objections to the project, or that she 
took a calculated risk that plaintiffs would not 
seek a judicial determination of the issues, or, if 
they did that they would not achieve success. Thus 
it is to be seen that it was not plaintiffs actions, 
or inactions, which induced defendants to proceed 
with the project but her own erroneous legal con-
clusion that the restrictive covenants were no 
longer enforecable. 610 P. Zd Ut. 1264. 
In the present case, Defendants-Appellants were notifeid by Plaintiffs· t 
Respondents that they were in violation of the restrictive covena11ts. In spite I 
of this, D£fendants-Appellants proceeded to circulate a petition trying to modi;,: 
the restrictive covenants. Since it was the Defendants own erroneous conclusic· 
that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable, they should assLD11e respons1· 
bility of the expenditures they made on the beauty parlor. 
CQ]l[;LUS ION 
this Court deny Defendan,J 
I 
court upholding the ' 
Plaintiffs-Respondents respectfully request that 
Appellants appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial 
restrictive covenant. 
DATED IBIS ~day of j)~, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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